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LIMITING THE EXPANSION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST 
DOCTRINE IN NEW JERSEY: A WAY TO PROTECT AND 
PRESERVE THE RIGHTS OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 
Stephanie Reckord∗
 
Oceanfront property presents unique conflicts between public 
and private notions of property law.  The public trust doctrine is a 
common law doctrine that seeks to balance the rights of both the 
private owner and the public.1  The doctrine seeks to protect the 
public, which has historical rights in the wet sand area, and the 
private landowner who claims an exclusive ownership interest in the 
dry sand area.2  Even so, conflicts often arise between the upland 
owner and the public, forcing courts to adjudicate these disputes.  
On one hand, a private owner has exclusive rights to the particular 
parcel in question.  On the other hand, the parcel in question is 
located in a geographic location that has substantial value to the 
public at large.  This type of adjudication involves a delicate balance 
between private property ideals and the rights of the public at large.3  
Because of New Jersey’s unique geography, beach conflict cases often 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2006, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2001, 
Fairleigh Dickinson University. 
 1 Michael A. Walker, Note, CERCLA’s Natural Resource Damage Provisions: A 
Loophole for Private Landowners?, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 425, 444 (1995).  For a discussion 
of the origins of the public trust doctrine, see discussion infra Part I. 
 2 Walker, supra note 1, at 444.  The wet sand area is the land between the mean 
high and low tide lines, while the dry sand area consists of the property landward of 
the mean high tide line.  Id. 
 3 See James S. Burling, Private Property Rights and the Environment after Palazzolo,  
30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 1–4 (2002). 
The battle over property rights in America has rekindled an age-old 
debate: whether our legal system is based upon the assumption that 
man uses and has dominion over property for his own benefit, limited 
only by the proviso that no harm is done to the public, or whether 
property can be put to private beneficial use only with the consent of 
the sovereign, and that “private” property is held subject to an inchoate 
trust for larger societal interests. 
Id. at 2. 
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arise and a substantial amount of case law in the field has developed,4 
making New Jersey a pioneer in this area.5
Beachfront property law in New Jersey can be broken down into 
three contexts.  The first context involves the application of the 
public trust doctrine to beaches that are municipally-owned and 
maintained.6  Traditional problems in this area often involve beach 
fees and the permissibility of resident or member classifications.7  
The New Jersey Supreme Court has not permitted such 
classifications, and the court has held that the doctrine demands that 
the upland dry sand beaches of municipalities be open equally to all 
for a wide variety of recreational purposes.8  The second context 
involves “quasi-municipal” beaches,9 which refers to beaches that 
hold themselves out as providers of recreational services, such as 
private beach clubs and associations.10  In the landmark case, 
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n,11 the court subjected such 
quasi-public beaches to the same rules as municipal beaches, thus 
 4 Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571, 573 (N.J. 1978).  In Van Ness, the 
court stated: 
The Public Trust Doctrine has always been recognized in New Jersey.  
It is deeply engrained in our common law, due, no doubt, to New 
Jersey’s unique location on the Atlantic Ocean, Delaware and New York 
Bays with numerous rivers and tributaries emptying into these bodies, 
resulting in extensive shorelines and considerable tidal waters and tidal 
lands in the State. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 5 Sean T. Morris, Note, Taking Stock in the Public Trust Doctrine: Can States Provide 
for Beach Access Without Running Afoul of the Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence?, 52 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 1015, 1020–21 (2003); Gilbert L. Finnel, Jr., Public Access to Coastal Public 
Property Judicial Theories and the Taking Issue, 67 N.C. L. REV. 627, 641 (1989) (“New 
Jersey’s Supreme Court is a leader in applying the public trust doctrine to protect the 
public’s rights to use dry sand beaches.”). 
 6 For examples of how New Jersey views the role of municipal beaches and the 
rule that municipal beaches must be held open to all equally regardless of resident 
or member status, see Van Ness, 393 A.2d at 574, and Borough of Neptune City v. 
Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 55 (N.J. 1972). 
 7 See Van Ness, 393 A.2d at 573–74; Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 48–49. 
 8 See Van Ness, 393 A.2d at 574; Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 55. 
 9 See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 368 (N.J. 1984).  
In Matthews, the court deemed the defendant, Bay Head Improvement Association, 
to be “quasi-municipal” because its “activities paralleled those of a municipality in the 
operation of the beachfront.”  Id. 
 10 Id.  The New Jersey Supreme Court considered the totality of the 
circumstances to determine that the particular beach in question was “quasi-
municipal.”  Id.  The court explained: “[w]hen viewed in its totality—[the 
Association’s] purposes, relationship with the municipality, communal characteristic, 
activities, and virtual monopoly over the Bay Head beachfront—the quasi-public 
nature of the Association is apparent.”  Id. 
 11 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984). 
RECKORD FINAL.DOC 10/12/2005  5:53:21 PM 
2005] COMMENT 251 
 
holding that access cannot be restricted.12  Further, the court held 
that such beaches must allow public use of the upland dry sand areas 
as well as the traditional wet sand area.13  The third context is that of 
the private beachfront homeowner.14  The holding in Matthews, 
although limited to the quasi-public nature of the beach in the 
controversy, did determine that “private land is not immune from a 
possible right of access to the foreshore for swimming or bathing 
purposes, nor is it immune from the possibility that some of the dry 
sand may be used by the public incidental to the right of bathing and 
swimming.”15
New Jersey has tackled these inherent conflicts between owners 
and the public within the framework of the three contexts laid out 
above.16  New Jersey courts have granted substantial rights to the 
public at the expense of the private owner in both the first and 
second contexts.17  Although there is no precedent with respect to 
the third context, the natural progression seems to be towards 
granting the public more rights in private beaches.18  Yet, it is unclear 
how the courts will decide cases involving homeowners’ associations 
on the beachfront or an individual homeowner’s exclusive possession 
of the beach adjacent to its home.19
On July 26, 2005, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the 
most recent case in the line of beach controversies, Raleigh Avenue 
Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc.20 The central issue in Raleigh 
concerned conflicts between the owner of a private beach club and 
the public over beach access and use.21  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court, following Matthews, held that access could not be restricted to 
 12 See id. at 368. 
 13 Id. at 364, 368. 
 14 With respect to this third context, Matthews is still the leading case on point in 
that it demonstrates the court’s willingness to extend the public rights under the 
public trust doctrine to private upland dry sand beaches.  See id.  at 369–70. 
 15 Id. at 369. 
 16 See generally Matthews, 471 A.2d at 363; Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 
571, 573 (N.J. 1978); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 
A.2d 47, 48–49 (N.J. 1972). 
 17 See Matthews, 471 A.2d at 364, 368; Van Ness, 393 A.2d at 574; Neptune City, 294 
A.2d at 55. 
 18 Matthews, 471 A.2d at 369–70. 
 19 In Matthews, the court refrained from deciding this issue.  It did expressly limit 
its holding to the quasi-municipal nature of the beach, but conceded that 
“considerable uncertainty will continue to surround the question of the public’s right 
to cross private land and to use a portion of the dry sand . . . .”  Id. at 370. 
 20 Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005). 
 21 Id. at 113. 
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members of the beach club only.22  The court mandated that Atlantis 
Beach Club (“Atlantis”), a private owner, must permit the public to 
vertically access the wet sand and allow the public to enjoy the entire 
upland dry sand area.23  Furthermore, the court found that Atlantis 
may only charge a reasonable fee for access and use.24  The court’s 
willingness to follow and expand the holding in Matthews 
demonstrates the court’s disregard for the rights and privileges of 
private ownership. 
Since the New Jersey Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 
Matthews, the rights of private owners of beachfront property are in a 
state of concern, if not jeopardy.25  New Jersey has often expanded 
the doctrine to fit the changing needs of the public.26  Although 
courts have the ability to make changes to a particular field of law, in 
the case of the public trust doctrine, such changes can be unfair and 
arbitrary because they affect the rights of landowners who are 
constitutionally protected from uncompensated seizure of property.27  
Were the legislature or the executive, rather than a court, to mandate 
a private owner to open private property to the general  public, 
commentator Barton Thompson has suggested that “the United 
States Supreme Court would almost certainly hold that the state had 
taken the owners’ property in violation of the Constitution.”28
 22 Id. (holding that “the public trust doctrine requires the Atlantis property to be 
open to the general public at a reasonable fee for services provided by the owner and 
approved by the Department of Environmental Protection”). 
 23 See id. at 124. 
 24 Id. at 125 (affirming the Appellate Division’s determination that the 
Department of Environmental Protection’s authority “includes jurisdiction to review 
fees proposed by Atlantis for use of its beach” and that such fees shall be limited to 
“an amount ‘required to operate and maintain the facility’ as a guide, and that fees 
will not be approved if they operate to ‘limit access by placing an unreasonable 
economic burden on the public’” (quoting Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis 
Beach Club, 851 A.2d 19, 33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004), aff’d, 879 A.2d 112  
(N.J. 2005))). 
 25 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1451–52 
(1990) (discussing the recent trend of restricting private property rights in order to 
expand those of the public and/or the government). 
 26 Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984); 
Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972). 
 27 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“Nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public 
use without just compensation.”).  See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. N.J. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Protection, 64 F. Supp. 2d 354, 356 (D.N.J. 1999) (plaintiffs alleging a 
regulatory taking where a building regulation required owners to build and maintain 
a walkway along the waterfront). 
 28 Thompson, supra note 25, at 1450.  National Ass’n of Home Builders, although 
applying the public trust doctrine to an allegation of a taking, is not relevant because 
it involves a claim of a regulatory taking.  See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 64 F. Supp. 
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This Comment argues that courts should avoid expanding the 
doctrine to accomplish what legislative and administrative bodies 
would be constitutionally prohibited from doing.  This Comment 
proposes that courts not use the doctrine to bypass the requirements 
of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, which requires 
compensation after a taking of private property by the government.29  
Because of the nation’s strong commitment to private ownership,30 
the public trust doctrine should not be used as a tool to grant further 
rights to the public at the expense of the private landowner.31  A slow 
and steady expansion of this doctrine not only violates constitutional 
rights, but also leads to the eradication of private oceanfront property 
and leaves landowners uncompensated, disenfranchised, and without 
notice of the actual geographic scope of their property.32  Courts 
should not permit “the state [to] evade the due process and takings 
limits on the police power by extending the reach of the public trust 
doctrine.”33
This Comment will argue for appropriate limitations on the 
public trust doctrine.  It will begin by presenting the historical and 
general background of its development.  Part I provides a policy 
discussion of the doctrine’s original underlying purposes and goals.  
Further, Part I advocates limiting the expansion of the doctrine to 
those objectives.  Part II provides a chronological view of New Jersey’s 
expansion of the doctrine as a way of enlarging the public’s rights to 
the foreshore and dry sand area.  Part III discusses the inherent 
conflicts involved in owning beachfront property.  Specifically, it 
addresses the conflicts between fundamental notions of private 
property and the rights of the public concerning access to and use of 
2d at 356.  This Comment is concerned with state court interpretations of the public 
trust doctrine, not its application to the analysis of a regulatory taking. 
 29 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 30 See Burling, supra note 3, at 1–4.  Burling states: “Indeed our Constitution was 
but the latest manifestation of the long-standing natural law understanding that an 
individual’s property should not be taken without compensation.”  Id. at 4. 
 31 James L. Huffman, Symposium on the Public Trust and the Waters of the American 
West: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: Introduction and Overview: A Fish out of Water: The 
Public Trust Doctrine in Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527, 559 (1989) (“By 
expanding the scope of public trust rights, the state will expand its ability to regulate 
beyond the constraints of the Constitution.  The state can thus evade the due process 
and takings limits on the police power by extending the reach of the public trust 
doctrine.”). 
 32 Id.  Professor Huffman describes such taking of rights from one group and 
granting them to another as too “easy and unprincipled.”  Id. at 567. 
 33 Id. at 559.  The Due Process Clause and the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment are applicable to the States by means of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
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the wet and dry sand areas.  Part IV discusses the United States 
Supreme Court’s analysis of the takings doctrine and links the 
constitutional protections of the Fifth Amendment to the recent 
judicial expansions of the public trust doctrine.  To do so, a synopsis 
of the takings doctrine, eminent domain, and property jurisprudence 
will be necessary. 
Last, Part V advocates a limited public trust doctrine specifically 
designed for New Jersey.34  This Comment proposes that courts 
should not expand the doctrine as an end run around the takings 
doctrine.  Private property requires courts to maintain clear and 
distinct boundary lines and to respect the fundamental rights of 
landowners as well as those of the public.35
I. BACKGROUND 
The public trust doctrine is a common law creature with ancient 
roots.36  Historically, the doctrine protected the land where the tide 
ebbed and flowed.37  The doctrine provides that the land adjacent to 
the water’s edge is held in trust for the people by the state.38  In 
theory, then, regarding oceanfront property, the land subject to the 
“ebb and flow” of the tide is beneficially owned by the people.39  The 
land subject to the doctrine is often referred to as the “wet sand.”40  
The public’s right as trust beneficiary is “subject to reasonable 
limitations, to use public trust lands and associated navigable (or 
public trust) waters for a wide variety of commercial and recreational 
purposes.”41
 34 Morris, supra note 5, at 1020–21 (“New Jersey courts have been both pioneers 
and leaders in their application of the Public Trust Doctrine, being among the first 
to both discuss the concept and to expand its usage.”). 
 35 Burling, supra note 3, at 1–4; Huffman, supra note 31, at 567.  According to 
Professor Huffman, “[b]y confusing the property rights character of the public trust 
doctrine with concepts of trust law, constitutional rights, judicial review, and 
governmental power, the courts and commentators have opened the door to 
dramatic expansion of governmental power with resultant intrusions upon individual 
rights.”  Id. 
 36 Walker, supra note 1, at 444. 
 37 Id.  The ebb and flow of the tide is often referred to as navigable waters.  Id.  
Courts have interpreted the area to be the sand between the high and low tide lines.  
See, e.g., Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 26 (1929). 
 38 DONNA R. CHRISTIE & RICHARD G. HILDRETH, COASTAL AND OCEAN MANAGEMENT 
LAW 8 (2d ed. 1999). 
 39 JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 2 (2d ed. 2002). 
 40 Id.  Title to the land below the mean high-tide line that comprises the wet sand 
is held by the state.  Id. 
 41 Id. 
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The doctrine has its roots in Roman law, which considered 
certain objects to be subject to common ownership.42  Specifically, the 
air, water, and sea were viewed as common property.43  According to 
Roman law, “[t]he use of these resources was available to all, so long 
as the conduct of one individual did not infringe upon the use of 
resources by others.”44  The English followed this principle but 
changed the idea of common ownership to that of state ownership.45
Under English common law, the king as the sovereign 
controlled the lands “subject to the ebb and flow of the tides, often 
referred to as land under navigable waters,” in trust for the public.46  
Therefore, “the Crown could not appropriate the resources for its 
own use or convey them to others.”47  Technically, title, referred to as 
jus privatum, was in the king as sovereign, but dominion over the 
lands, referred to as jus publicum, was vested in the Crown as a trust 
for the benefit of the public.48  Under this scheme, the public 
acquired two principal rights: fishing and navigation.49
Today, land above the mean high tide line to the line of 
vegetation, called the “dry sand,” is subject to private ownership.50  
The land below the mean high tide line, called the “wet sand,” 
however, is held in trust by the state for the public.51  For this reason, 
the lands that comprise the wet sand are often called the “public trust 
lands” or the “sovereignty lands.”52  As beneficiary of this trust, the 
public has rights subject to “reasonable limitations” to use the public 
trust lands for a number of purposes that vary from state to state.53
 42 Walker, supra note 1, at 444. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 CHRISTIE & HILDRETH, supra note 38, at 8. 
 47 Walker, supra note 1, at 444. 
 48 CHRISTIE & HILDRETH, supra note 38, at 19; Charles F. Wilkinson, Symposium on 
the Public Trust and the Waters of the American West: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: 
Introduction and Overview: The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source 
and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 430–31 (1989). 
 49 Jose L. Fernandez, Untwisting the Common Law: Public Trust and the Massachusetts 
Colonial Ordinance, 62 ALB. L. REV. 623, 628 (1998) (“Of these two public uses, 
navigation has historically been considered the superior right.”). 
 50 KALO ET AL., supra note 39, at 1.  This is the general rule, but there are some 
states that use the low tide line as the mark of private ownership.  Mark Cheung, 
Dockominiums: An Expansion of Riparian Rights That Violates the Public Trust Doctrine, 16 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 821, 835 (1989).  Those states that use the low tide line still 
subject the land between the low and high tide lines to the trust doctrine.  Id. 
 51 KALO ET AL., supra note 39, at 2. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
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Lateral or horizontal access is considered a public right under 
the public trust doctrine,54 following from the traditional purpose of 
the doctrine.  The doctrine was designed so that the public could, for 
fishing and navigational purposes, make use of the wet sand area.55  
Therefore, the public right to horizontal access cannot be restricted 
as long as the horizontal access is in the wet sand area.56  However, 
there are some traditional ways in which the public can gain vertical 
or perpendicular access through private property.57  The public may 
achieve such access through prescription,58 implied dedication,59 or 
customary use.60
In addition, private ownership interests may also exist in the 
public trust lands.61  These interests consist of common law rights and 
privileges to use the waters and wet sand areas and are classified as 
either littoral or riparian rights.62  Littoral rights are those rights of 
 54 CHRISTIE & HILDRETH, supra note 38, at 42. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 KALO ET AL., supra note 39, at 91.  In order to succeed through prescription, 
the public’s use must be open and notorious, continuous and uninterrupted, and 
adverse for the prescribed amount of time by statute.  Id.  Achieving access through 
prescription is often difficult because it is near impossible for such a large group as 
the public to meet all of the elements of prescription.  CHRISTIE & HILDRETH, supra 
note 38, at 43.  Christie and Hildreth state: “Establishing adverse use can be the 
greatest obstacle to overcome in acquiring a public prescriptive easement [because] 
[p]ermissive use can never ripen into an easement.”  Id. at 44. 
 59 KALO ET AL., supra note 39, at 92.  In order to gain access through implied 
dedication, the public must show through acts and circumstances “that the 
landowner intended to donate an easement to the public and that such an offer was 
impliedly accepted.”  CHRISTIE & HILDRETH, supra note 38, at 45.  Difficulty arises if 
implied dedication is used to secure access and use of private dry sand because the 
owner of the particular parcel must have stopped using the property for the requisite 
time period; concurrent use will not satisfy dedication and would thus be considered 
a revocable license.  Luise Welby, Comment, Public Access to Private Beaches: A Private 
Necessity, 6 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 69, 80–81 (1986). 
 60 See KALO ET AL., supra note 39, at 93.  Commentaries have “defined the 
requirements of custom to be public use that is ancient, exercised without 
interruption, reasonably, obligatory, and not repugnant to other custom law.”  
CHRISTIE & HILDRETH, supra note 38, at 47.  Customary rights “evolved from the belief 
that a usage that lasted for centuries must have been founded on a legal right 
conferred in the distant past, and, therefore, should be recognized and enforced 
even though never formally recorded.”  Welby, supra note 59, at 82.  The difficulty 
with using custom law to gain access and use of private lands is that the geographic 
area claimed must be specific and reasonable.  Id. at 84.  Thus, gaining a significant 
portion of beach for the public would require vast and costly litigation on a parcel-by-
parcel basis.  Id. 
 61 KALO ET AL., supra note 39, at 2. 
 62 Id. 
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owners associated with saltwater bodies and freshwater lakes.63  
Riparian rights refer to the rights of owners in rivers and other 
freshwater bodies.64  The state maintains title to coastal waters.65
Upon the colonization of America, title to American tidal waters 
passed from the king to the respective colonies.66  After the American 
Revolution, title over lands under tidal waters vested in the states.67  
Before the acquisition of new territories, the tidal lands were held in 
trust by the United States government until the time of new state 
creation.68  At the time of state creation, title to tidal lands within the 
new state’s boundaries was passed to the newly created state.69
The United States officially adopted the public trust doctrine as 
part of the common law, but granted title to the states allowing each 
to administer its own version of the trust.70  In Illinois Central Railroad 
Co. v. Illinois,71 the Supreme Court acknowledged the public’s rights 
inherent in the trust doctrine when it upheld the revocation of a land 
grant by a state noting that a state “can no more abdicate its trust over 
property in which the whole people are interested . . . than it can 
abdicate its police powers . . . .”72  Therefore, by the late Nineteenth 
Century, the United States recognized the duty of the states to 
protect the lands subject to the trust.73  The Court also emphasized 
that all navigable waterways are subject to the public trust doctrine 
under federal law.74  Therefore, although the states have title and 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Walker, supra note 1, at 445. 
 67 CHRISTIE & HILDRETH, supra note 38, at 9. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 19. 
 71 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
 72 Id. at 453.  The Court’s acceptance of the doctrine under federal law solidified 
the position that the lands subject to the public trust doctrine could not be 
transferred free of the public’s claim.  The Court explained that “[t]he trust with 
which they are held, therefore, is governmental and cannot be alienated, except in 
those instances mentioned of parcels used in the improvement of the interest thus 
held, or when parcels can be disposed of without detriment to the public interest in 
the lands and waters remaining.”  Id. at 455–56. 
 73 See id. 
 74 Id. at 453–54. 
It is the settled law of this country that the ownership of and dominion 
and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters, within the limits of 
the several States, belong to the respective States within which they are 
found, with the consequent right to use or dispose of any portion 
thereof, when that can be done without substantial impairment of the 
interest of the public in the waters, and subject always to the 
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power, the public trust doctrine is created under federal law, making 
it mandatory for the states to maintain some version of the doctrine.75  
This is significant in light of the recent expansions of the doctrine, 
because once the geographic area covered by the trust is increased, it 
is permanently subject to the trust. 
In Shively v. Bowlby,76 the Supreme Court explained that tidal 
lands are distinguishable from those landward of the high tide line 
because of their equal importance to all for purposes of commerce, 
navigation and fishery.77  The Court stated: “Their improvement by 
individuals, when permitted, is incidental or subordinate to the 
public use and right.  Therefore, the title and the control of tidal 
lands are vested in the sovereign for the benefit of the whole 
people.”78  In other words, the rights of private individuals are 
subordinated to the rights of the public to enjoy the area for 
commerce, navigation, and fishing.  Furthermore, while the states 
have discretion in determining proper uses of the trust lands, Shively 
reiterated that states are limited to that which “can be done without 
substantial impairment of the interest of the public in such waters, 
and subject to the paramount right of Congress to control their 
navigation so far as may be necessary for the regulation of 
commerce.”79
II. NEW JERSEY’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE  
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
Proponents of increasing beach access and expanding the 
geographic area of the public trust lands often urge state courts to 
utilize the public trust doctrine to meet their goals.80  Because of the 
failings of other attempts to secure increased public access and rights, 
public advocates are now recommending the use of the public trust 
paramount right of Congress to control their navigation so far as may 
be necessary for the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and 
among the States. 
Id. at 435. 
 75 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 435.  The Supreme Court “left it to the individual 
states to determine the development and implementation of the Public Trust 
Doctrine.”  Morris, supra note 5, at 1019.  In other words, “the states are federally 
prohibited from abrogating the public trust entirely.”  Wilkinson, supra note 48, at 
464. 
 76 152 U.S. 1 (1894). 
 77 See id. at 17. 
 78 Id. at 57. 
 79 Id. at 47. 
 80 Thompson, supra note 25, at 1535–37; Morris, supra note 5, at 1039–40. 
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doctrine, and they often cite Matthews as the leading case on point.81  
Matthews, however, was not the first New Jersey case to entertain the 
doctrine’s expansion.82  New Jersey’s expansion has been an ongoing 
and cumulative process.83
A. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea 
Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea84 presented 
the issue of whether a municipality could charge non-residents a 
higher fee than residents to access its beaches.85  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that a municipality may not restrict access based 
on individuals’ residency.86  To reach this conclusion, the court 
utilized the public trust doctrine to expand the rights associated with 
public trust lands beyond the traditional rights of fishing and 
navigation.87  Although the court conceded that the “original purpose 
of the doctrine was to preserve for the use of all the public natural 
water resources for navigation and commerce,”88  it considered the 
doctrine to be flexible and not limited to its original purposes.89
In holding that a municipality may not discriminate on the basis 
of residency, the court used the doctrine to mandate that access must 
be provided for all equally.90  The New Jersey Supreme Court held 
that: 
at least where the upland sand area is owned by a municipality—a 
political subdivision and creature of the state—and dedicated to 
public beach purposes, a modern court must take the view that 
the public trust doctrine dictates that the beach and the ocean 
 81 James M. Kehoe, The Next Wave in Public Beach Access: Removal of States as Trustees 
of Public Trust Properties, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1935–37 (1995); Morris, supra note 
5, at 1039–40. 
While the theories of eminent domain, custom and implied dedication 
are all of some assistance in acquiring public easements across and 
upon private shore property, none of them will be effective as a long-
term solution.  Only the public trust doctrine has the potential to 
provide a long-range solution to the public access problem. 
Welby, supra note 59, at 102. 
 82 See discussion infra Parts II.A and II.B. 
 83 Morris, supra note 5, at 1021–22. 
 84 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972). 
 85 Id. at 48. 
 86 Id. at 55. 
 87 Id. at 51, 54. 
 88 Id. at 52. 
 89 Id. at 54. 
 90 Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 55. 
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waters must be open to all on equal terms and without preference 
and that any contrary state or municipal action is impermissible.91
To reach its decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court interpreted the 
public trust doctrine broadly.92  It explained that “public rights in 
tidal lands are not limited to the ancient prerogatives of navigation 
and fishing, but extend as well to recreational uses, including 
bathing, swimming and other shore activities.”93  Never before had 
New Jersey provided for such wide latitude.  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court changed the public trust doctrine so that it could “be molded 
and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it 
was created to benefit.”94  Thus, the Neptune City court’s expansion of 
the doctrine was two-fold: it increased the public’s inherent rights to 
include recreation and it enhanced the public’s right of access to 
include the upland dry sand of municipal beaches. 
In his dissent, Justice Francis predicted the continued expansion 
of the doctrine.95 The justice explained that the public has 
considerable rights in the land seaward of the mean high tide line, 
but questioned the majority’s expansion of the public’s rights in trust 
lands and in municipal upland dry sand beaches.96  Further, Justice 
Francis argued that the majority’s holding necessarily meant that the 
public would be able to make use of all private dry sand areas, not 
just those on municipal beaches.97  Justice Francis posed the corollary 
question: “[O]f what utility [are the recreational rights] if access from 
the upland does not exist or is refused by the upland owner?”98  
Disagreeing with the expansion of rights and the determination that 
all municipal dry sand beaches must be open to all equally, Justice 
Francis espoused the opinion that the public does not have rights on 
privately-owned dry sand beaches.99
B. Van Ness v. Borough of Deal 
Van Ness v. Borough of Deal100 reinforced the decision in Neptune 
City, as Van Ness only concerned the application of the public trust 
 91 Id. at 54. 
 92 See id. at 51. 
 93 Id. at 54. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 56 (Francis, J., dissenting). 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 56–57.  According to Justice Francis, “a private owner could legally fence 
in his entire beach area upland of the mean high water mark . . . .”  Id. at 57. 
 100 393 A.2d 571 (N.J. 1978). 
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doctrine to municipal dry sand beaches.101  The particular conflict 
involved whether a municipally-owned beach, Deal Casino, could 
limit a part of the beach for Deal residents who were members of the 
casino.102  The casino did not restrict the public’s access to the 
waterfront or its use of the beach adjacent to the high water mark.103  
However, a portion of the upland dry sand beach was reserved for 
members of the casino and their guests.104  The Public Advocate 
argued that the dry sand of the casino must be open to the public in 
its entirety.105  Deal, on the other hand, argued that, because the 
public could enjoy the rights associated with the wet sand area and 
because the particular beach was never dedicated to the public, it 
could continue to limit access to an area of the dry sand to its 
members.106  The trial court agreed with the Public Advocate,107 while 
the Appellate Division sided with the municipality.108
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, relying on its holding 
in Neptune City.109  Again, the court announced that municipally-
owned dry sand beaches must be open to all members of the public 
equally.110  Significantly, Van Ness “abandoned the limitation found in 
[Neptune City] that the upland must be dedicated to public beach 
purposes in order for the doctrine to apply.”111  Instead, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that because the casino dedicated the 
beach for recreational purposes in general, the rule of Neptune City 
 101 Id. at 573. 
 102 Id. at 572. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 572–73. 
 106 Van Ness, 393 A.2d at 572. 
 107 Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 352 A.2d 599, 608–09 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1975), rev’d, 367 A.2d 1191 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), rev’d, 393 A.2d 571 (N.J. 
1978).  The Chancery Division held: “Deal is discriminating illegally against 
nonresidents . . . .”  Id. at 609.  Interestingly, the court did not base its decision on 
the public trust doctrine, but on municipal power and equal protection theories.  See 
id. 
 108 Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 367 A.2d 1191, 1197–98 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1976), rev’g, 352 A.2d 599 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975), rev’d, 393 A.2d 571 
(N.J. 1978).  The Appellate Division held that Deal Casino had satisfied the 
requirements of the public trust doctrine because it had set aside “a reasonable 
portion of the beach” for public use.  Id. 
 109 Van Ness, 393 A.2d at 573–74. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Geoffrey R. Scott, The Expanding Public Trust Doctrine: A Warning to 
Environmentalists and Policy Makers, 10 FORDHAM ENVTL. LAW J. 1, 42 (1998). 
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applied.112  The case also made clear that the entire beach, both the 
wet and dry sand areas, had to be available to all citizens regardless of 
their status as residents or members.113  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court, however, did expressly limit its holding by noting that “[w]e 
are not called upon to deal with beaches on which permanent 
improvements may have been built, or beaches as to which a claim of 
private ownership is asserted.”114
Justice Mountain dissented from the majority’s holding, 
specifically on the grounds that the doctrine had not been clearly 
defined.115  Therefore, the justice argued that the courts should 
refrain from applying the doctrine to all municipally-owned dry sand 
beaches.116  More importantly, Justice Mountain expressed concerns 
that such an application constituted a compensable taking.117  
Further, the justice dismissed the fact that a municipality held the 
property in question.118  According to Justice Mountain, the court 
effectuated a taking despite its lack of eminent domain powers.119  
The justice summarized his view in the closing comments: 
[N]o more land or water should be found to come within the 
ambit of the public trust until such time as the scope and 
contours of this doctrine are made clear.  It is especially necessary 
to decide what role, if any, the Legislature is entitled or required 
to play.  There should also be an initial determination as to 
whether the inclusion of municipally owned dry beach land 
within the public trust—making it available to indiscriminate 
 112 Van Ness, 393 A.2d at 573–74.  The court explained: 
The fact that Deal has never dedicated the Casino beach to the use of 
the general public is immaterial.  The beach is dedicated to 
recreational uses including bathing, swimming, surf fishing and other 
shore activities.  If the area, which is under municipal ownership and 
dedication, is subject to the Public Trust Doctrine, and we hold that it 
is, all have the right to use and enjoy it. 
Id. 
 113 Id. at 573 (“[I]n New Jersey, a proper application of the Public Trust Doctrine 
requires that the municipally owned upland sand area adjacent to the tidal waters 
must be open to all on equal terms and without preference.” (citation omitted)). 
 114 Id. 
 115 Van Ness, 393 A.2d at 575 (Mountain, J., dissenting). 
 116 Id.  The justice explained: “[I]t seems to me improvident to rule now that great 
stretches of our most valuable beach properties shall be subject to this amorphous 
and ill-defined doctrine.”  Id. at 576. 
 117 Id. at 577. 
 118 Id. at 578 (“It is the accepted law of New Jersey that municipal property, at least 
if not held in a governmental capacity, when taken by the State, must be paid for.”). 
 119 Id. 
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usage—is or is not a compensable taking and whether the 
judiciary should purport to exercise the taking power.120
Although the court expressly limited the holding in Van Ness to 
municipal beaches, the state of the public trust doctrine was still 
ambiguous.121  Van Ness reiterated that the public trust doctrine is 
dynamic.122  This left open the question as to whether the court would 
“mold” the doctrine in the future to require access to and use of non-
municipal beaches should the day come when the “public needs” 
demand it.123  The answer came a few years later when the New Jersey 
Supreme Court revisited the public trust doctrine and made sweeping 
changes to its application.124
C. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n 
The holdings in Neptune City and Van Ness opened the door for 
later modifications to the doctrine.125  Irrespective of the rights 
inherent in trust lands, the public’s rights are limited to the 
geographic area covered by the public trust doctrine.126  Matthews, 
however, has threatened the balance by allowing the courts to also 
expand the geographic breadth of the doctrine to include privately-
owned dry sand.127  Matthews’ expansion of the public trust doctrine 
 120 Van Ness, 393 A.2d at 579 (Mountain, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
 121 See Scott, supra note 111, at 43. 
 122 Van Ness, 393 A.2d at 573. 
 123 See Scott, supra note 111, at 43. 
 124 See id. at 43–44.  Professor Scott states: “In its decision the court disclaimed any 
reliance on the traditional acquisitive theories of dedication or prescription.  Instead, 
it chose to ground itself squarely on a newly defined public trust doctrine.”  Id. at 44. 
 125 Marc R. Poirier, Environmental Justice and the Beach Access Movements of the 1970s 
in Connecticut and New Jersey: Stories of Property and Civil Rights, 28 CONN. L. REV. 719, 
778 (1996) (“Neptune City v. Avon’s articulation of the public trust doctrine became 
the linchpin of subsequent beach access cases in New Jersey.”). 
 126 Sarah C. Smith, Note, A Public Trust Argument for Public Access to Private 
Conservation Land, 52 DUKE L. J. 629, 648–49 (2002).  Smith writes: “The public trust 
argument is, of course, limited to public trust land.  Land that is not part of the 
public trust will not be protected from a takings argument . . . .”  Id. at 648. 
 127 See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984).  
The court in Matthews wrote: 
We see no reason why rights under the public trust doctrine to use of 
the upland dry sand area should be limited to municipally-owned 
property. . . . Today, recognizing the increasing demand for our State’s 
beaches and the dynamic nature of the public trust doctrine, we find 
that the public must be given both access to and use of privately-owned 
dry sand areas as reasonably necessary. 
Id. 
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in New Jersey provided ammunition to proponents for greater public 
access to the beaches.128
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n129 presented a case 
involving a quasi-municipal beach, Bay Head Improvement 
Association (the “Association”), that limited use of its beaches to 
members only.130  The Association was a nonprofit corporation 
owning and leasing beachfront property.131  Its membership was 
limited to residents of Bay Head who paid a yearly fee, and non-
members were only permitted to use the beach after hours and in the 
off-season.132  The plaintiffs claimed that the Association denied the 
public access and use of the beach.133
Because the holdings in Neptune City and Van Ness were limited 
to municipally-owned and controlled beaches,134 the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey evaluated the public trust doctrine’s application to 
privately-owned dry sand beaches.135  In announcing that the public 
may have a right to use the dry sand of private beaches, the court 
reasoned that “without some means of access the public right to use 
the foreshore would be meaningless.”136  The court limited its 
decision to beaches that the court deemed “quasi-municipal.”137  The 
court based this determination on the fact that “[t]he Association’s 
activities paralleled those of a municipality in its operation of the 
beachfront.”138  In making this determination, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court considered factors such as size, services rendered, 
and maintenance functions.139  The majority reasoned: “When viewed 
in its totality—its purposes, relationship with the municipality, 
communal characteristic, activities, and virtual monopoly over the 
Bay Head beachfront—the quasi-public nature of the Association is 
 128 See Morris, supra note 5, at 1022–23; Scott, supra note 111, at 44. 
 129 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984). 
 130 Id. at 359. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 358.  The original parties to the suit included the neighboring town of 
Point Pleasant as a plaintiff and the town of Bay Head as a defendant.  However, the 
claim against Bay Head was dismissed because it did not own the beach.  Eventually, 
Point Pleasant stopped pursuing its claims.  Id. 
 134 Matthews, 471 A.2d at 363. 
 135 Id. at 363–64. 
 136 Id. at 364.  The court articulated that “[r]easonable enjoyment of the 
foreshore and the sea cannot be realized unless some enjoyment of the dry sand area 
is also allowed.”  Id. at 365. 
 137 Id. at 365–66. 
 138 Id. at 368. 
 139 Matthews, 471 A.2d at 368. 
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apparent.”140  The court in Matthews did not limit its holding to access 
issues.141  Instead, it granted the public an additional public trust 
right, the right to use the dry sand of private beaches in certain 
circumstances.142  While the court greatly expanded the public’s trust 
rights, it did warn that the right to access and use private dry sand is 
not a right to unrestricted access.  The court further noted that the 
public interest is protected where there is some reasonable access to 
the water.143  The opinion in Matthews, however, is quite significant 
for several reasons.  First, it accomplishes this right of access through 
its interpretation of the public trust doctrine, not by any other 
property principles, such as dedication or easement.144  Quoting 
Neptune City, New Jersey’s highest court again reiterated the dynamic 
nature of the doctrine.145  Second, the opinion directly avoided 
applying the doctrine to purely private beaches.146  Instead, the 
holding is limited to quasi-municipal beaches like those involved in 
the case.147  Nevertheless, the court did decide that “private land is 
not immune from a possible right of access to the foreshore for 
swimming or bathing purposes, nor is it immune from the possibility 
that some of the dry sand may be used by the public incidental to the 
right of bathing and swimming.”148  In sum, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court limited its holding to quasi-municipal beaches, but added a 
disclaimer that circumstances may warrant application to private 
beaches in the future.149
D. Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc. 
On July 26, 2005, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the 
most recent beach access and use dispute.150  The court picked up on 
the expansion of the public interest in private beachfront property 
where Matthews left off.  In Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 365 (“The bather’s right in the upland sands is not limited to passage.”). 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365 (quoting Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of 
Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972)). 
 146 Id. at 369.  The court declined to rule on the Public Advocate’s claim that all 
private beaches should be open to the public.  Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005) 
[hereinafter Raleigh  II]. 
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Club, Inc.,151 the court held that the public cannot be restricted from 
access and use of Atlantis Beach Club (“Atlantis”), a private beach, 
even though the court never expressly found that Atlantis was “quasi-
municipal.”152
Atlantis is located in the Diamond Beach neighborhood of 
Lower Township, and its western boundary is along an unpaved 
section of Raleigh Avenue.153  The beach belonging to Seapointe 
Village (“Seapointe”), north of Atlantis, is open to the public.154  
Because of limited access to the beachfront, members of Raleigh 
Avenue Beach Association (“Association”), comprised of residents 
living on Raleigh Avenue in the Diamond Beach section, are forced 
to walk one-half mile to reach the nearest free access point.155  In 
1996, Atlantis went private, charging fees to its members to access 
and use the beach.156  Problems arose between Atlantis and the 
Association when a member of the Association was charged with 
trespassing while crossing Atlantis’ beach, the most direct route to his 
home.157  Subsequently, Atlantis “filed an Order to Show Cause and 
Verified Complaint against [the trespasser], other unnamed persons, 
Lower Township, and the State of New Jersey” to permanently enjoin 
the public from trespassing upon its property.158  Atlantis also sought 
a declaration that it was not required to permit the public to access or 
use its beach.159  In response, the Association filed a complaint against 
Atlantis seeking free access and use of a reasonable amount of dry 
sand, claiming that Atlantis’ beach is subject to the public trust 
 151 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005). 
 152 Id. at 120–21, 124.  While the court recognized that Matthews’ narrow holding 
was limited to its unique facts (i.e. the public nature of the Bay Head Improvement 
Association and its close relationship to the municipality), the court nevertheless 
disregarded the first determination made in Matthews: that the Association was quasi-
public, and therefore, the holdings of Neptune City and Van Ness applied to it.  See 
infra notes 137–40 and accompanying text. 
 153 Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 113–15. 
 154 Id. at 114.  The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection required 
Seapointe’s beach to be open to the public as a condition of its 1987 permit issued 
pursuant to the Coastal Area Facility Review Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:19-1 to -21 
(West 2004).  Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 114. 
 155 Id. at 115.  The court noted that “[a]ccess is blocked by condominium 
buildings located at the terminus of the other streets in the area.”  Id. 
 156 Id. at 115–16.  Before Atlantis established the private club, the beach was free 
and open to the public.  Id. at 115.  The fees in 2002 were $700 per family per season 
for eight beach tags.  Id. 
 157 Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 116. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
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doctrine.160  In addition, the Department of Environmental 
Protection (“DEP”) “sought a ruling on the question whether the 
beach along the Atlantic Ocean in the Diamond Beach area is subject 
to the public trust doctrine such that an individual can walk along the 
ocean shore on the Atlantis property without fear of prosecution for 
trespassing . . . .”161
In reversing the trial court162 and holding that Atlantis’ 
beachfront is subject to the public trust doctrine, the Appellate 
Division placed much emphasis on the fact that the Township did not 
provide similar services to the public.163  The court thus held that 
Atlantis, a private owner, must permit the public to vertically as well 
as horizontally access its property and to make reasonable use of its 
dry sand beach as necessary to accommodate the public’s recreational 
rights in the foreshore.164  In addition, the court held that Atlantis 
could only charge a “commercially reasonable fee” to those members 
of the public who remained on the beach for longer periods of 
time.165  The Appellate Division found that the fees Atlantis charged 
for access and use of its beach “discriminated against individuals and 
small families by forcing them to pay an amount bearing no rational 
relationship to the cost associated with individual use of the 
property.”166
Relying heavily on Matthews, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
affirmed the Appellate Division.167  Purporting to apply the Matthews 
factors, the court held that the public trust doctrine applied to 
 160 Id.  Around this time, “the DEP issued an Administrative Order and Notice of 
Civil Administrative Penalty Assessment . . . to Atlantis for conducting CAFRA-
regulated activities on its property without obtaining required permits.”  Id. 
 161 Id. at 117. 
 162 Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 117.  The trial court held that Atlantis must permit 
access to the ocean and allow the public use of a three-foot wide strip of its dry sand.  
Id.  Further, the court held that the DEP’s authority does not extend to the 
regulation of the use of Atlantis’ dry sand.  Id. 
 163 Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 851 A.2d 19, 22 (N.J. 
Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2004), aff’d, 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005) [hereinafter Raleigh I]. 
 164 Id. at 30.  The court further stated: “We are satisfied that Atlantis’s attempts to 
limit access to, and use of, its upland sand are hostile to the public trust doctrine and 
not sustainable on appeal.”  Id. 
 165 Id. at 22.  The Appellate Division stated: “All members of the public who use 
the waterfront are entitled to use Atlantis’s adjacent upland sand for extended 
periods and must be afforded a fair opportunity to pay a reasonable single-person 
fee.”  Id. at 33. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 113. 
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Atlantis and that Atlantis must open its beach to all members of the 
public.168
Unlike the court in Matthews, however, the court did not focus 
on the quasi-public factor.169  The court acknowledged the quasi-
public nature of the Improvement Association in Matthews, but never 
addressed the issue of whether Atlantis was in fact quasi-public.170 
Rather, the court proceeded to apply the Matthews factors to 
determine the “appropriate level of accommodation” of the interests 
of the owner.171  In doing so, the court looked at  the “[l]ocation of 
the dry sand area in relation to the foreshore, extent and availability 
of publicly-owned upland sand area, nature and extent of the public 
demand, and usage of the upland sand land by the owner . . . .”172  By 
only applying the factors, the court did an injustice to the holding in 
Matthews.  The court in Matthews first determined that the beach at 
issue so mirrored the activities and roles of a municipality that the 
holdings of Neptune City and Van Ness applied to it.173  Once it is 
determined that the beach is quasi-public, the next prong of the test 
is to determine the amount of dry sand that will satisfy the public’s 
rights while, at the same time, accommodating the interests of the 
owner.174  It is also important to note that although the court in 
Matthews held that private land is not immune from public access and 
use, the court added that the public’s right is not one of “unrestricted 
access” and its rights are satisfied where there is reasonable access to 
the water.175
Dissenting in Raleigh, Justice Wallace pointed out that the 
Matthews court held that the upland dry sand had to be open to all 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. at 120–21. 
 170 Id. at 121.  The court in Raleigh II, discussing the quasi-public nature of the 
Improvement Association in Matthews, stated: 
The Improvement Association was closely connected with the 
municipality, which provided at various points in time, office space, 
liability insurance, and funding, among other things.  That symbiotic 
relationship, as well as the public nature of the activities conducted by 
the Improvement Association, led the Court to conclude that the 
Improvement Association was in reality a “quasi-public body” . . . . 
Id. at 120–21 (citing Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 366–68 
(N.J. 1984)). 
 171 Id. at 121 (citing Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365–66). 
 172 Raleigh II, 879 A.2d 121–23 (quoting Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365). 
 173 See Matthews, 471 A.2d at 368. 
 174 Id. at 365–66. 
 175 Id. at 364. 
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because it was quasi-public in nature.176  In Raleigh, the court never 
found Atlantis to be quasi-public; therefore, the primary focus should 
have been on accommodating the interests of the owner, as Matthews 
made clear.  The court, however, held that Atlantis beach has to be 
open to all in its entirety, begging the question: does this 
accommodate the owner’s interest?177
While Matthews did warn that circumstances may warrant finding 
such rights in purely private beaches, it refrained from deciding the 
issue and expressly stated: 
We realize that considerable uncertainty will continue to 
surround the question of the public's right to cross private land 
and to use a portion of the dry sand as discussed above. Where 
the parties are unable to agree as to the application of the 
principles enunciated herein, the claim of the private owner shall 
be honored until the contrary is established.178
The court in Raleigh, however, focused primarily on the unavailability 
of public beaches in the Township,179 public demand,180 the “La Vida 
CAFRA permit condition,”181 and “the type of use by the current 
 176 Id. at 367–68; Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 127 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (“Thus, in 
Matthews, the entirety of the beach was privately-owned, but by a quasi-public 
organization.”).  Justice Wallace filed a dissent, in which Justice Rivera-Soto joined.  
See id. at 125. 
 177 The court in Matthews explained that  
[w]hile the public's rights in private beaches are not co-extensive with 
the rights enjoyed in municipal beaches, private landowners may not in 
all instances prevent the public from exercising its rights under the 
public trust doctrine. The public must be afforded reasonable access to 
the foreshore as well as a suitable area for recreation on the dry sand. 
Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365–66 (emphasis added).  The court never held that the 
public would be entitled to use and access of all of a private landowner’s upland dry 
sand without first finding that the beach in question was quasi-public or quasi-
municipal in nature. 
 178 Id. at 370. 
 179 Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 121–22.  While it is true that there are no publicly-owned 
beaches in Lower Township, there are public beaches in Wildwood Crest, north of 
Lower Township.  See id.  More importantly, Seapointe is a public beach that provides 
lifeguards, public restrooms, showers, and parking.  See id. at 114.  Seapointe is 
located north of La Vida, which is immediately west of Atlantis.  Id. 
 180 Id. at 122.  The court emphasized pubic demand, but in its discussion the 
majority points only to the residents who live in walking distance of Atlantis.  See id.  
The court also mentions the general “enormous public interest in the New Jersey 
shore . . . .”  Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 122. 
 181 See id. at 122–23.  The majority, in analyzing the “usage of the upland sand 
land by the owner” factor, explained that Atlantis beach was open to the public prior 
to 1996.  Id. at 122.  In 1986, La Vida Condominium’s CAFRA building permit was 
conditioned on the homeowner’s association being responsible for public access to 
the beach.  Id.  According to the Court, the fact that the permit describes a portion 
of dry sand beach leads to the conclusion that the dry sand area was meant for public 
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owner as a business enterprise.”182  Without finding that the particular 
beach in issue was quasi-public or quasi-municipal, the court ordered 
a private owner to provide services and open its property to the 
public free of charge.183
Further, the court held that the DEP will determine a reasonable 
fee that Atlantis can charge to those members of the public who 
choose to remain on its dry sand for a longer period of time.184  The 
court noted: “We expect that the DEP will use N.J.A.C. 7:7E-8.11(b)4, 
which limits fees at publicly-owned beaches to an amount ‘required 
to operate and maintain the facility’ as a guide, and that fees will not 
be approved if they operate to ‘limit access by placing an 
unreasonable . . . burden on the public.’”185  Administration of this 
type of order is not likely to be a simple task.  It is unclear what an 
unreasonable burden is and how long a person must remain on the 
dry sand before a fee can be charged.  Because the public may make 
use of the dry sand area to rest and relax between swimming, it will 
be difficult to determine what is reasonable access and what 
constitutes a sufficient area of dry sand.186  In addition, even though 
Atlantis may charge a fee to those who remain on its beach, the court 
use.  See id. at 123.  The court noted, however, that it would not “consider the permit 
dispositive on the issue of public use” because neither party made it.  Id.  Yet, the 
majority “highlighted” the CAFRA permit condition as evidence of “longstanding 
public access to and use of the beach” at the end of the opinion.  Raleigh II, 879 A.2d 
at 124. 
 182 Id. 
 183 See id.; Raleigh I, 851 A.2d at 30.  Atlantis did not object to providing lifeguard 
services free of charge to those members of the pubic who used the ocean, but did 
not remain on its dry sand.  Raleigh I, 851 A.2d at 30.  Atlantis did, however, object to 
the DEP’s jurisdiction over the determination of fees for those who remained on its 
beach for longer periods of time.  See id. at 30–31.  The Appellate Division held that 
the DEP did have jurisdiction and that it could review fees charged by Atlantis to 
those who used its beach.  See id. at 31–32.  The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed 
the Appellate Division’s judgment regarding fees.  See Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 124–25. 
 184 Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 125. 
 185 Id. (quoting Raleigh I, 851 A.2d at 33).  The court acknowledged “that Atlantis, 
as a private entity, should be allowed to include expenses actually incurred for 
reasonable management services (in addition to reimbursement for other costs) in 
the fee calculation.”  Id.  Further, the court noted that Atlantis has the “independent 
and inherent right . . . to provide cabanas for rent . . . or to engage in other similar 
business enterprises for profit, e.g., beach chair rentals, food concessions, etc.”  Id. 
 186 See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984) 
(“Precisely what privately-owned upland sand area will be available and required to 
satisfy the public’s rights under the public trust doctrine will depend on the 
circumstances.”).  The court in Matthews did not lay out a precise formula.  Instead, 
the court noted the rule in broad terms: “private landowners may not in all instances 
prevent the public from exercising its rights under the public trust doctrine.  The 
public must be afforded reasonable access to the foreshore as well as a suitable area 
for recreation on the dry sand.”  Id. at 366. 
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is effectively disallowing a private entity the right to profit by only 
permitting Atlantis to charge a “reasonable fee.”187
Justice Wallace found that the majority incorrectly held that the 
application of the factors weighed in favor of the plaintiff.188  
Specifically, the dissent pointed out that the second factor, “the 
extent and availability of publicly-owned upland sand area,” favored a 
judgment for Atlantis because Seapointe, a neighboring beach, is 
open to the public.189  The dissent also found that the final factor, 
“usage of the upland sand by the owner,” weighed in favor of the 
defendant because Atlantis had been operating as a private beach for 
the last nine years.190
The dissent, in applying the test and rules of Matthews, found 
that the public’s rights would be satisfied by “granting access to the 
ocean and an easement across the private sand area owned by the 
Atlantis Beach Club to access the beach at Seapointe” and 
“expand[ing] the horizontal access across defendant’s property to a 
ten-foot-wide strip above the high water mark.”191  Justice Wallace 
explained that ten feet of dry sand would be enough space for the 
public to enjoy the ocean and the beach while, at the same time, 
accommodating the rights of the private owner.192  The dissent’s 
approach to resolving this issue is true to the holding in Matthews, 
which emphasized the need to accommodate the interest of the 
private owner.193  The majority’s conclusion that no accommodation 
of the owner’s interest is necessary leads to the question: Is this a 
compensable taking?  Justice Mountain, in his dissenting opinion in 
Van Ness, expressed such concerns: 
Suddenly the magic wand labeled “public trust” is gently waved 
and, lo and behold, what had been a beach reserved solely for 
residents of the Borough has been transformed into a beach open 
to the general public.  It matters not at all in what terms this bit of 
 187 See Raleigh  I, 851 A.2d at 33.  Indeed, the appellate court stated: “The notion 
that lands are to be held in public trust, protected and regulated for the common 
use and benefit, is incompatible with the concept of profit.”  Id. 
 188 Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 127–28 (Wallace, J., dissenting).  The dissent wrote: “In 
balancing the above factors, it is obvious that the greater weight favors access to the 
ocean and the use of the water below the mean high water mark.”   Id. at 128. 
 189 Id.  Justice Wallace explained that Seapointe’s open beach “strikes a proper 
balance between the public trust doctrine, which requires reasonable access and use 
of the ocean and beaches, and a private owner’s right to use its property as it deems 
fit.”  Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. at 125–26. 
 192 Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 129 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
 193 Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365–66 (N.J. 1984). 
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judicial legerdemain is couched.  The fact remains that one right 
in the bundle of rights we call ownership has been destroyed—the 
right to exclude others.  There has been a compensable taking, 
accomplished by judicial act.  But the judiciary may not exercise 
the power of eminent domain!194
III. AREAS OF CONFLICT 
Because the public has rights to the land subject to the public 
trust doctrine, private landowners are in a unique position.  As littoral 
owners, they also have interests in the wet sand area.195  The primary 
reason for owning beachfront property is its proximity to the ocean.  
Therefore, it is no surprise that the wet sand area presents conflicts 
between these two groups.  These conflicts primarily exist in regards 
to how the public may access the foreshore, the rights associated with 
the wet sand area, and, now, the areas the public is permitted to 
use.196
Historically, “the foreshore of the entire coast is said to be held 
in trust for the public for the explicit purposes of navigation and 
fishing.”197  In more recent times, states, such as New Jersey, have 
expanded the category of uses permitted in the foreshore, while 
other states have not.198  In states with a more liberal doctrine, the 
public’s rights were eventually “extended to those incidental 
privileges that were necessary for the public enjoyment of a right.”199  
Some states agree that recreational uses are among those that the 
doctrine permits, while other states maintain that the historical 
purposes of navigation and fishing are exhaustive.200  The Supreme 
Court of New Jersey rationalized increasing the geographic scope by 
linking the amount of space needed by the public to the recreational 
rights covered under the trust doctrine.201  In doing so, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court inferred that a right to swim or sunbathe is 
useless without the right to relax and utilize some part of the dry 
sand, demonstrating that the types of uses permitted directly 
 194 Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571, 578 (Mountain, J., dissenting). 
 195 KALO ET AL., supra note 39, at 2. 
 196 Welby, supra note 59, at 70. 
 197 Id. at 85. 
 198 Id. at 87.  For example, “Massachusetts’ judicial opinions proclaim that the 
only justification for taking the use of private land without compensation is the 
improvement of fishing or navigation—the two areas originally covered by the public 
trust.”  Id. at 88. 
 199 Fernandez, supra note 49, at 628. 
 200 Welby, supra note 59, at 87–88. 
 201 See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984). 
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correlate to the amount of land that will be considered subject to the 
trust.202
Because of the failures of prescription, dedication, and 
customary use, the courts have resorted to expanding the public trust 
doctrine to grant further rights to the public without a need for 
compensation.203  Another benefit of using the public trust doctrine 
that proponents of public beach access cite is that an expansion of 
the doctrine amounts to changes to all private beachfront owners 
regardless of the litigants to the instant suit.204  As a result, one 
judicial determination changes the nature of the rights of all private 
landowners.205  This expansion is of great concern because it 
effectuates a denial of due process to all owners who are affected by 
such judicial activism. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has employed the public trust 
doctrine to increase the permitted rights and uses and the 
geographic scope of the doctrine.206  Specifically, in Matthews, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court warned private landowners that “the 
opportunity to swim [a right recognized in New Jersey] may be 
entirely dependent upon the public’s ability to reach the 
foreshore.”207  Although the court did not hold that the public could 
vertically access private beaches, it did expressly caution that 
circumstances might warrant such a decision.208  The court’s decision 
in Raleigh found such circumstances to exist when it mandated that a 
private entity, not expressly found to be quasi-public, open its beach 
to all and that the state can determine the fee it may charge.209  Such 
limitless expansion affects the entire coastline of the state and 
negatively impacts all oceanfront landowners, despite the fact that 
none were ever before the court.210  Expanding the doctrine beyond 
that for which it was designed may be done out of good intention to 
enhance public rights, but it also significantly disregards the private 
property rights that Americans cherish. 
 202 Id. 
 203 See Welby, supra note 59, at 85–87. 
 204 See id. at 87. 
 205 See id. 
 206 See Raleigh II, 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005); Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement 
Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984); Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571  
(N.J. 1978); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 
(N.J. 1972). 
 207 Welby, supra note 59, at 86. 
 208 Matthews, 471 A.2d at 363–64. 
 209 Raleigh II, 879 A.2d at 124–25. 
 210 See Welby, supra note 59, at 87. 
RECKORD FINAL.DOC 10/12/2005  5:53:21 PM 
274 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:249 
 
While the rights of the public to the wet sand area are 
guaranteed and protected as a matter of law, the area landward of the 
high tide line is not.211  Urged by proponents of increased public 
rights to beaches,212 courts are now willing to entertain expansion of 
the geographic areas covered by the public trust doctrine.213  
Specifically, Raleigh demonstrates that the New Jersey Supreme Court 
is willing to permit public use of and access to privately-owned dry 
sand beaches.214  This willingness threatens the security enjoyed by 
private landowners and the rights to exclusive use and ownership of 
private property.  Furthermore, the lack of compensation to such 
owners is unconstitutional. 
PART IV.  THE SUPREME COURT—THE PUBLIC TRUST  
AND THE TAKINGS DOCTRINE 
A. The Takings Doctrine 
The Fifth Amendment requires compensation after a 
government seizure of private property.215  Thus, when the 
government acts to protect the public trust lands in a way that 
diminishes private interests in the land, “those adversely affected will 
claim that there is a ‘taking’ of some private property interest for 
which compensation is required.”216  If, however, a court in a decision 
redefines the boundaries of the trust lands, “a private property 
interest thought to exist may be defined out of existence” along with 
the takings claim.217  A court, however, should not be permitted in a 
single case to broadly redefine these boundaries affecting all 
landowners. 
Since its recognition of the public trust doctrine in Illinois 
Central, the Supreme Court has rarely interfered with the states’ 
authority to administer their own versions of the public trust 
doctrine.218  The lack of interpretations of the doctrine by the 
Supreme Court has allowed a variety of differing state policies 
 211 Id. at 75. 
 212 Id. (“Beach access advocates argue that this dry sand area is crucial to the full 
enjoyment of the ocean itself.”). 
 213 See Raleigh II, 879 A.2d 112; Matthews, 471 A.2d 355. 
 214 See Raleigh II, 879 A.2d 112. 
 215 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 216 KALO ET AL., supra note 39, at 2. 
 217 Id. 
 218 See Morris, supra note 5, at 1019–20. 
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concerning the treatment of private waterfront property.219  Outside 
of the public trust doctrine, however, the Supreme Court has not 
hesitated to act when the primary issue in the case concerns a takings 
claim.220
The Fifth Amendment protects individuals from loss of private 
property as a result of government action.221  Although the Fifth 
Amendment is applicable to the federal government, the states are 
also bound by it by means of the Fourteenth Amendment.222  Physical 
takings by the government for its use or for use by the public are “per 
se takings” that demand compensation.223  Physical takings occur 
“when the state physically intrudes (or authorizes third parties to do 
so) onto private property, thus abrogating the private owner’s right to 
exclude others.”224  The right to exclude others coincides with a 
property owner’s right to exclusive possession.225
In regulatory takings,226 “government actions do not encroach 
upon or occupy the property [but] affect and limit its use to such an 
extent that a taking occurs.”227  The Supreme Court has outlined 
some factors to consider when determining whether or not a 
particular governmental action is a regulatory taking requiring 
compensation.228  If the regulation “denies all economically beneficial 
or productive use of the land,” the state must compensate the 
owner.229  Even if the regulation does not deny all economically 
beneficial or productive use of land, it may still be a taking.230  Other 
factors the Court will take into consideration include: “the 
regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which 
 219 See id. 
 220 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 221 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 222 See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001). 
 223 See, e.g., Jesse W. Barton, Note, Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. 
United States: Why it was Correctly Decided and What This Means for Water Rights, 25 
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L.  & POL’Y J. 109, 116 (2002). 
 224 Id.  Any physical invasion onto private property is a physical taking regardless 
of amount of land occupied.  Id. 
 225 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982) 
(“[P]ermanent physical occupation of property forever denies the owner any power 
to control the use of the property; he not only cannot exclude others, but can make 
no nonpossessory use of the property.”). 
 226 Barton, supra note 223, at 117. 
 227 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617 (citing Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 
(1922)). 
 228 See id. 
 229 Id. (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)). 
 230 See id. 
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the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed 
expectations, and the character of the government action.”231  Taken 
together, these factors, once evaluated, will determine whether 
compensation is necessary.232
Two important Supreme Court cases, Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission233 and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,234 evaluated 
state regulations of oceanfront property, demonstrating the Court’s 
position when a taking claim is raised.  In each case, the states were 
attempting to gain additional public beach and/or access through 
legislation or regulation.235 However, neither state had compensated 
the private owners.236  The Court rejected the states’ attempts to grant 
further access rights to the public on private beaches under the 
auspices of its police powers.237
B. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Supreme Court 
held that “to obtain easements of access across private property the 
State must proceed through its eminent domain power.”238  The 
California Coastal Commission (the “Commission”) had granted a 
building permit to the landowners, the Nollans, with the express 
condition that they provide a public easement across their oceanfront 
property.239  The Nollans brought suit to invalidate the condition, 
claiming that it violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.240  The Superior Court of Ventura County held in favor 
of the Nollans, finding no rational justification for the condition.241  
The California Court of Appeals reversed242 and flatly rejected the 
constitutional claim since the condition only diminished the overall 
 231 Id.  The Court utilizes the test outlined in Pennsylvania Central Transportation 
Co. v. New York City , 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 232 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617. 
 233 483 U.S. 825 (1987) [hereinafter Nollan II]. 
 234 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 235 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan II, 483 U.S. 825. 
 236 See Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003; Nollan II, 483 U.S. 825. 
 237 See infra Parts IV.B,  IV.C. 
 238 Nollan II, 483 U.S. at 832. 
 239 Id. at 828. 
 240 Id. at 829. 
 241 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28, 29 (1986)  
[hereinafter Nollan I]. 
 242 Id. at 32. 
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value of the property to the Nollans and did not “deprive [them] of 
the reasonable use of [their] property.”243
The United States Supreme Court disagreed and held that even 
a slight diminution in value may be enough to constitute a taking.244  
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia elaborated: 
In Loretto we observed that where governmental action results in 
“[a] permanent physical occupation” of the property, by the 
government itself or by others, “our cases uniformly have found a 
taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether 
the action achieves an important public benefit or has only 
minimal economic impact on the owner.”245
According to Justice Scalia, the proper focus should be on the nexus 
between the problem created by the development and the condition 
in the permit.246  Regulation is not a compensable taking if it 
“‘substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests’ and does not 
‘den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land.’”247
After determining that the state’s interest in protecting the 
beachfront is a legitimate one, the Court looked at the relationship 
between that interest and the condition on the Nollans’ building 
permit.248  The Commission argued that the Nollans’ new house 
would burden the public by interfering with “visual access” to the 
beaches.249  In turn, the Commission claimed, this interference would 
create a “psychological barrier” to the beaches, leading to demands 
for beach access.250  The Commission argued that those demands 
could only be satisfied by conditioning building permits on the 
coastline to those who are willing to provide public easements.251  The 
Court rejected this argument and considered the relationship too 
attenuated.252  Furthermore, the Court was skeptical about the 
 243 Id. at 30 (citing Grupe v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578, 595–96 
(1985)). 
 244 Nollan II, 483 U.S. at 831–32. 
 245 Id. at 832 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 
419, 434–35 (1982)). 
 246 Id. at 834. 
 247 Id. (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). 
 248 Id. at 838. 
 249 Id. 
 250 Nollan II, 483 U.S. at 838. 
 251 Id. 
 252 Id. at 838–39.  Justice Scalia wrote: 
It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people 
already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans’ 
property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new 
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Commission’s underlying motive because “there is heightened risk 
that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement, 
rather than the stated police-power objective.”253
The Court emphatically noted that a “‘permanent physical 
occupation’ has occurred  .  .  .  where individuals are given a 
permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real 
property may continuously be traversed, even though no particular 
individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the 
premises.”254  Thus, in order to gain vertical access to the ocean, the 
state must compensate the private landowners or satisfy the nexus test 
outlined by Justice Scalia: the state must show that a regulation 
substantially advances a legitimate state interest without denying the 
owner economically viable use of the land.255  Since the Commission 
failed to meet this test, regulations like those involved in Nollan are 
not permitted without compensation to the private landowners.256 
Nollan also addressed basic American principles concerning private 
property.257  The Court classified the right to exclude others as “‘one 
of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly 
characterized as property.’”258  The Court declared that if a state 
wants to secure an easement in order to provide beach access to its 
house.  It is also impossible to understand how it lowers any 
“psychological barrier” to using the public beaches . . . . 
Id. at 838. 
 253 Id. at 841. 
 254 Id. at 832.  The Supreme Court, therefore, expressly refuted the argument 
made by beach access proponents that the public’s presence on private property to 
get to and from the ocean is minimal and is not an occupation in any permanent 
sense. 
 255 Nollan II, 483 U.S. at 834.  While a state may claim that beach access is a 
legitimate state interest, it is unclear whether the Supreme Court would find loss of 
the right to profit to be a denial of economically viable use of land, requiring 
compensation. 
 256 See id. at 839.  Specifically, the Court stated: “We therefore find that the 
Commission’s imposition of the permit condition cannot be treated as an exercise of 
its land-use power . . . .”  Id.  In Nollan, an easement could have been required 
without compensation if it was narrowly tailored to addressing the externalities 
caused by the development.  Nollan is different than a case like Raleigh because 
regulations, like those in Nollan, are clearly subject to the Fourteenth Amendment.  
With expansions of the public trust, however, the owner has no opportunity to 
challenge the state court’s judgment that resulted in a substantial impairment of the 
owner’s rights unless the Supreme Court is willing to grant certiorari. 
 257 See id. at 841.  The Court stated: “California is free to advance its 
‘comprehensive program,’ if it wishes, by using its power of eminent domain for this 
‘public purpose,’ . . . but if it wants an easement across the Nollans’ property, it must 
pay for it.”  Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V.). 
 258 Id. at 831 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 
419, 433 (1982)). 
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citizens, it must compensate the private property owner or be 
substantially advancing a legitimate state interest.259  The Supreme 
Court’s loyalty to traditional property values may be the only 
roadblock for states that intend to strip landowners of their Fifth 
Amendment rights.  However, the Court has yet to act when state 
court decisions, not state legislation, are responsible for “taking” 
private property.260
Nollan is a significant case with respect to the battle for public 
access and expansion of the public trust zone.  First, it demonstrates 
that the Supreme Court will not allow the states to disguise takings 
through the use of their police powers.261  Second, it expressly 
categorizes exclusive possession of private property as essential.262
C. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 
Lucas was another victory in the fight to protect waterfront 
owners because it further solidified the notion that government 
action that reduces the value of another’s property cannot be 
excused on the ground that it serves to benefit the public.263  Further, 
Lucas clarified the “harmful or noxious uses” exception to the 
compensation requirement.264  Lucas involved a property owner of 
two adjacent oceanfront lots.265  The owner, Lucas, purchased the 
land for $975,000 in 1986 with the intention of building single-family 
homes.266  However, in 1988, South Carolina passed the Beachfront 
Management Act (“Act”), which banned Lucas from building on the 
lots.267  Lucas alleged that the Act, in effect, constituted a taking 
without compensation.268  The trial court agreed, holding that the bar 
on construction rendered the property valueless and required 
compensation.269  However, the Supreme Court of South Carolina 
disagreed and reversed, basing its holding on the principle that, 
 259 Nollan II, 483 U.S. at 841–42. 
 260 In order to secure Supreme Court review, litigants would be prudent to assert a 
Fourteenth Amendment claim as early as possible.  The procedural impediments of 
preserving the takings claim for appeal are beyond the scope of this Comment, 
which advocates judicial restraint by state courts to avoid the impropriety of judicial 
takings altogether. 
 261 See Nollan II, 483 U.S. at 841. 
 262 Id. at 831. 
 263 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 264 See id. at 1022–23. 
 265 Id. at 1006. 
 266 Id. at 1007. 
 267 Id. 
 268 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991). 
 269 Id. 
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because the legislation aimed to prevent a serious harm by preserving 
the coastal areas, no compensation is required regardless of the effect 
on property value.270
The United States Supreme Court reversed and laid out some 
foundational rules regarding takings.271  First, the Court pronounced 
the general rule that, if a regulation deprives the landowner of all 
economic use of the property or renders the property valueless, the 
government must compensate.272  The Court also noted that the state 
may “resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into 
the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use 
interests were not part of [the owner’s] title to begin with.”273  Writing 
for the majority, Justice Scalia qualified the noxious use exception 
upon which the Supreme Court of South Carolina relied.274  The 
Justice explained that “the legislature’s recitation of a noxious-use 
justification cannot be the basis for departing from our categorical 
rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated.”275
Rather, the Court will consider numerous factors when 
determining whether compensation is due.276  Justice Scalia stated 
that the primary inquiry involves looking into the “nature of the 
owner’s estate” to determine whether the regulation deprives the 
owner of a right he had at the time the estate was acquired.277  The 
second inquiry, according to the majority, involves an analysis similar 
to that of state nuisance law, whereby a court engages in a balancing 
 270 Id. at 900–01. 
 271 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014–32 (1992). 
 272 Id. at 1027.  It is likely that Atlantic Beach Club would have a strong argument 
that the state court’s decision prevents it from profiting, and, therefore, deprives 
Atlantis Beach Club of all economic use. 
 273 Id.  This is particularly problematic in the area of the public trust expansions 
because once the scope of the doctrine is expanded, the rights of the private owner 
are retroactively altered.  In other words, the courts view the owner as never having 
had such rights.  The retroactive application of the doctrine further supports a 
limited interpretation of the public trust doctrine. 
 274 Id. at 1031. 
 275 Id. at 1026. 
 276 Id. at 1030. 
 277 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030.  Because of the retroactive nature of the public trust 
doctrine, the Court should not look to the expanded doctrine to determine the 
nature of the owner’s estate because that very expansion is the source of the takings 
claim.  Rather, the Court should look to the owner’s estate at the date of acquisition 
and compare it to the owner’s estate after the state court decision.  Otherwise, state 
courts’ decisions regarding the public trust doctrine would be immune from review. 
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of the harm posed by the owner’s conduct or use of the land and the 
benefit of restricting the owner’s rights to the public.278
With respect to the second inquiry, the state must do more than 
simply declare the uses the landowner is engaged in or desires to 
engage in as against the public interest.279  Instead, the state must 
demonstrate that the uses or desired uses of the owner violate 
principles of nuisance and property law.280  While the Council in 
Lucas relied on the noxious use exception, the second inquiry is 
based upon existing background property principles.281  The public 
trust doctrine would likely be considered a background state property 
principle.282  In a case challenging the expansion of the public trust, 
however, the focus should be on the preexisting interpretation of the 
doctrine.  This comports with the Supreme Court’s instruction that 
“[a]ny limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed 
(without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the 
restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property 
and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”283  Accordingly, a 
newly defined public trust doctrine cannot be a background property 
principle.284  Therefore, the analysis should focus either on the public 
trust doctrine as defined at the date of acquisition or, at least, on the 
doctrine as defined before the expansion.  This is the logical 
 278 Id. at 1030–32.  Public nuisance “encompasses a multitude of offenses against 
the public.”  Finnel, supra note 5, at 646.  “A public nuisance is a condition that 
interferes with a substantial public right.”  Walker, supra note 1, at 452.  According to 
the majority in Lucas, the second inquiry will entail an: 
analysis of, among other things, the degree of harm to public lands and 
resources, or adjacent private property, posed by the claimant’s 
proposed activities, the social value of the claimant’s activities and their 
suitability to the locality in question, and the relative ease with which 
the alleged harm can be avoided through measures taken by the 
claimant and the government . . . . 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030–31 (internal citations omitted). 
 279 See id. at 1031. 
 280 Id. at 1031–32. 
 281 Id. at 1030.  State law determines background principles of property law.  Id. 
 282 For a discussion of the vitality of the public trust doctrine as a background 
property principle, see Michael A. Blumm and Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: 
The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
321, 341–44 (2005). 
 283 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (parentheses in original). 
 284 In other words, “newly discovering or expanding such principles in order to 
protect resources now deemed valuable and in the public interest to preserve is 
inconsistent and irreconcilable with the protection of private rights in land 
traditionally associated with our system of government in the United States.”  David 
L. Callies and J. David Breemer, Selected Legal and Policy Trends in Takings Law: 
Background Principles, Custom and Public Trust “Exceptions”and the (Mis) Use of Investment-
Backed Expectations, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 339, 378 (2002) 
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interpretation of the application of the test in Lucas because the first 
inquiry focuses on the nature of the owner’s estate at the time it was 
acquired.  Thus, the second inquiry should also be limited to the time 
of acquisition. 
Lucas provides that the restriction placed upon the owner must 
be one that comports with common law property principles.285  While 
the public trust doctrine is a common law principle,286 an expansion 
that so distorts the original interpretation would not satisfy the 
second prong of the test.287  To determine if the use sought to be 
restricted is one that is based upon a common law prohibition, Justice 
Scalia proposed looking at whether “a particular use has long been 
engaged in by similarly situated owners” and whether “other 
landowners, similarly situated, are permitted to continue the use 
denied to the claimant.”288  Private owners on the beach have long 
been permitted to restrict access and use of the land above the mean 
high tide line.289  Only in the cases of municipally-owned or quasi-
municipal beaches has the public trust doctrine mandated access and 
use of the entire dry sand area.290  Likewise, private homeowners on 
the beachfront may continue to exclude others from the mean high 
tide line to the line of vegetation.291  The public trust doctrine, 
historically and traditionally, only requires that the public have use of 
the wet sand area.292  This leads to the conclusion that the state action 
“goes beyond what the relevant background principles would 
dictate,” and therefore, “compensation must be paid to sustain it.”293
 285 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030–32. 
 286 See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 64 F. Supp. 
2d 354 (D.N.J. 1999) (applying the public trust doctrine as a defense to a takings 
claim and using the holding in Matthews as a guide).  This Comment does not argue 
that the public trust doctrine is not a background property principle.  Rather, this 
Comment urges state courts not to reformulate the doctrine beyond its traditional 
scope.  The traditional scope of the doctrine, therefore, is a permissible defense to a 
takings claim as it is rooted in common law. 
 287 See Callies and Breemer, supra note 284, at 372 (explaining that “the fit 
between the public trust and the background principles exception fades as the 
doctrine drifts from its historical moorings”). 
 288 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031. 
 289 See Welby, supra note 59, at 86. 
 290 See generally Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355  
(N.J. 1984); Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571 (N.J. 1978); Borough of 
Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972). 
 291 See generally Matthews, 471 A.2d 355; Van Ness, 393 A.2d 571; Neptune City, 294 
A.2d 47. 
 292 KALO ET AL., supra note 39, at 2. 
 293 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030. 
RECKORD FINAL.DOC 10/12/2005  5:53:21 PM 
2005] COMMENT 283 
 
Lucas, like Nollan, provides the landowner with further support 
against unwarranted government seizures.  Lucas is particularly 
helpful in that it clarifies the law regarding takings for the benefit of 
the public or to prevent harmful uses.294  Presently, a state may not 
simply categorize a use as harmful or claim that the reason for the 
regulation is to provide the public with a benefit.295  Rather, the state 
will have to establish its argument in court to escape compensating 
the owner under the law of property.296  In sum, the state “‘may not 
transform private property into public property without 
compensation.’”297
D. Linking the Takings Doctrine to the Expansion of the  
Public Trust Doctrine 
The takings doctrine is of particular importance in the area of 
the public trust doctrine.  First, it provides private landowners with a 
way to combat overzealous state actions.298  It is especially effective 
when the government action at issue is legislation.299  Second, the 
takings doctrine emphasizes the value of private property in our 
society.300  Because of its importance, the Constitution provides 
safeguards for individuals whose property is threatened with 
seizure.301  Therefore, the Supreme Court must uphold this 
constitutional right to be free from seizure of private property 
without compensation.  It is unclear, however, whether the Court is 
willing to police state judicial actions that result in loss of private 
property.302  The issue of the Takings Clause as it applies to judicial 
action has never been directly addressed.303  Most experts have 
expressed doubts as to the likelihood of the Court’s subjecting 
judicial actions to the protections of the Fifth Amendment.304  
Opponents to subjecting judicial regulation to Takings Clause 
 294 See id.  at 1038–42. 
 295 Id. at 1038–42. 
 296 Id. at 1032. 
 297 Id. at 1031 (quoting Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 
155, 164 (1980)). 
 298 See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Lucas v. S.C. 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); see discussion supra Parts IV.B–C. 
 299 Douglas L. Grant, Western Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Some Realism 
About the Takings Issue, 27 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 423, 428 (1995). 
 300 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 301 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 302 Grant, supra note 299, at 428. 
 303 Id. 
 304 Thompson, supra note 25, at 1451. 
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requirements claim it “would constrain societally needed change too 
much [and] that takings protections are less necessary for such 
regulation because [they are] typically more principled and 
nonpolitical than legislative or administrative regulation.”305
The Fifth Amendment may also provide protection to 
landowners from arbitrary judicial actions.306  In other words, 
expansion of the public trust doctrine presents the issue of whether 
such court actions should be reviewed in light of the Takings 
Clause.307  It presents the question of whether a court, a 
governmental body just like a legislature, may grant public use and 
access rights to private property without due compensation.308  The 
takings doctrine is interpreted as a protection from government 
action that results in loss of private property.309  As often analogized, 
property rights are like a bundle of sticks.310  If the state directly 
removes one of the sticks from the bundle or claims it as its own, “it is 
considered a taking and the state will be forced to pay 
compensation.”311  Considered in this light, it is difficult to reconcile a 
court’s expansion of the scope of the public trust doctrine that results 
in a change to the owners’ bundle with such an expansion not 
requiring compensation.312  In essence, “by exempting courts from 
the takings protections, we create an imbalance that invites the state 
to attempt to accomplish through the judiciary what it cannot 
accomplish through the other branches of government—thereby 
unnecessarily skewing the appropriate division of responsibility 
between the branches.”313
In Shelley v. Kraemer,314 the Supreme Court held that a state 
court’s enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant violated the 
 305 Grant, supra note 299, at 428. 
 306 See Thompson, supra note 25, at 1451 (analyzing the issue of exempting 
judicial determinations from the takings protections). 
 307 Id. 
 308 Id. (“Faced by growing environmental, conservationist, and recreational 
demands, for example, state courts have recently begun redefining a variety of 
property interests to increase public or governmental rights, concomitantly shrinking 
the sphere of private dominion.”). 
 309 See Barton, supra note 223, at 116. 
 310 Id. (“Each stick in this bundle represents a right that the owner holds against 
others.   Some of these rights include the right to exclude others from the property, 
the right to sell the property, the right to transfer the property, the right to possess, 
and the right to use.”). 
 311 Id. 
 312 Thompson, supra note 25, at 1544. 
 313 Id. 
 314 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
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Fourteenth Amendment.315  Specifically, the Court held that state 
judicial enforcement is state action for the purposes of the 
Amendment.316  The opinion noted that “it has never been suggested 
that state court action is immunized . . . simply because the act is that 
of the judicial branch of the state government.”317  In the same way, 
judicial action should be considered state action for the purposes of 
the Fifth Amendment.  State court decisions that effectuate takings of 
private property should not be immune from the constitutional 
requirement of compensation.  As the Shelley Court clarified, the 
relevant inquiry should be whether the state court action resulted in a 
constitutional violation.318  Just as the Supreme Court interpreted the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court should interpret the Fifth 
Amendment to “[make] void ‘State action of every kind’ which is 
inconsistent with the guaranties therein contained, and [should 
extend] to manifestations of ‘State authority in the shape of laws, 
customs, or judicial or executive proceedings.’”319  Constitutional 
protections not only prohibit certain executive and legislative actions, 
they prohibit certain governmental actions in general, including 
those of the judiciary.  Allowing one branch to violate the protections 
that our forefathers considered essential to free government defeats 
the purpose of having such protections at all.320
V. CONCLUSION 
All of the New Jersey cases involving interpretation of the public 
trust doctrine show a steady expansion of public rights to municipal 
 315 Id. at 14. 
 316 Id.  The defendants raised the defense that enforcement of the covenants 
would violate the Fourteenth Amendment in their amended answer.  Brief for 
Petitioners at 2, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (No. 87), 1947 WL 30427.  
The United States Supreme Court may review final judgments by a state’s highest 
court “where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed 
under the Constitution.”  U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2000).  Federal jurisdiction exists when 
the case involves “a direct adjudication against the validity of a right or privilege 
claimed under a law of the United States.”  Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 9 (1894).  
Therefore, litigants intending to appeal a state’s supreme court decision should 
allege a Fourteenth Amendment claim at the outset of the litigation.  At least, the 
private owner should make such an allegation at the time the first state court 
expands the public trust doctrine, effectuating a loss of a property right. 
 317 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 18. 
 318 Id. 
 319 Id. at 14 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 17 (1883)). 
 320 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 148 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting) (“‘The 
fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require that the rights of 
personal liberty and private property should be held sacred.’” (quoting Wilkeson v. 
Leland, 27 U.S. 627, 657 (1829))). 
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beaches,321 to quasi-municipal beaches, and quite possibly to privately-
owned beaches in special circumstances.322  The New Jersey courts 
have distorted the traditional protections of the doctrine.323  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court in Matthews should have arrived at the same 
result without expanding the doctrine beyond recognition.  Instead, 
like in Van Ness, the court could have based its decision to grant the 
public access to the Association’s beach on the fact that it had already 
been dedicated to public recreation.324  Before Matthews, private 
landowners knew their rights and appreciated that they ended at the 
high water mark.  Today, private landowners do not have that same 
level of understanding.  The courts did not consider factors like 
“stability of title in land, the essential qualities of private ownership 
including the right to exclude others, constraints upon retrospective 
alterations of the definitions of land title, and any limits upon the 
public interest in communal use of property that may be found in the 
prohibitions of takings.”325  New Jersey today has one of the most 
expansive public trust doctrines.326
However, the doctrine has drifted too far from its original 
purposes.  The courts have thus taken a doctrine with “a seemingly 
respected place in the historical jurisprudence of Britain and the 
United States” and “employed [it] to assertively readjust notions of 
the private and public interests in property.”327  While the original 
doctrine protected both the public and the private landowners, 
contemporary courts use the doctrine as a way to redistribute 
property.328  Proponents of such judicial activism acknowledge the 
redistributive element in this policy but claim that the “bonuses” to 
the public outweigh the “sacrifices” of the landowners.329  Whether 
this is true depends upon one’s particular values.  Therefore, 
allowing the courts to make this determination involves a policy 
determination that is properly left to the legislatures.330  The courts  
 321 See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47  
(N.J. 1972). 
 322 See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984). 
 323 The public trust doctrine’s main purpose is to protect the wet sand area 
(seaward of the mean high tide line) because of its importance to all.  See Shively v. 
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894). 
 324 See Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571, 573–74 (N.J. 1978). 
 325 Scott, supra note 111, at 44. 
 326 Morris, supra note 5, at 1020–21. 
 327 Scott, supra note 111, at 4. 
 328 Kehoe, supra note 81, at 1937. 
 329 Id. 
 330 See W. David Sarratt, Note, Judicial Takings and the Course Pursued, 90 VA. L. REV. 
1487, 1491 (2004) (“In general, legislatures are presumed to act prospectively, saying 
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should not drastically change property law by implanting their own 
ideas of policy.331  Rather, if changes are necessary, the political 
branches should institute such changes because legislative decisions 
are firmly subject to the built-in restraint of the takings doctrine.332  
The courts’ role is to interpret law and apply it to the current case 
before it,333 not to change centuries of law because of public 
pressure.334  Any property redistribution should be accomplished 
through the states’ power of eminent domain.335
Since it is doubtful that the judiciary will subject its own 
determinations to the protections of the Takings Clause,336 the courts 
should not redistribute private property to the public without 
providing some sort of relief to the affected owner.  In other words, 
courts should not utilize the public trust doctrine to bypass 
constitutional rights and requirements.  The courts should clearly 
define the geographic scope of the doctrine as well as the rights 
associated with it, and any changes to the definition should only 
apply prospectively.  A narrow interpretation of the doctrine would 
eradicate any confusion over notice and provide the private owner 
with greater protections.  Another option that would be fair to private 
owners is a tax deduction for those owners who involuntarily or 
voluntarily open their property to the public.  This provides some 
relief to owners who must maintain the property and may be subject 
to new liabilities. 
Limiting the expansion of the public trust doctrine would 
protect investment expectations337 and, in turn, provide for stable and 
predictable real estate investments.  More importantly, state courts 
should be more conservative in their application of the public trust 
doctrine when expansion would directly affect the rights and 
privileges of the private owner, specifically where the proposed 
what the law shall be, while courts are presumed to decide questions retrospectively, 
saying what the law is and has been.”). 
 331 See Thompson, supra note 25, at 1544. 
 332 See Welby, supra note 59, at 91. 
 333 See Sarratt, supra note 330, at 1534 (discussing the effects judicial activism has 
on the balance of power between the branches of government). 
 334 See Scott, supra note 111, at 44 (“In sum, it might be observed that New Jersey 
has generally taken a politically active and acquisitive approach to the public trust 
doctrine, and the courts have responded in support.”). 
 335 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 336 See generally id. (discussing the controversy of exempting judicial 
determinations from the takings protections). 
 337 See Kehoe, supra note 81, at 1914 (“Public access to all oceanfront property 
irrespective of the landowners’ rights would cause an extreme diminution in 
property values of privately owned oceanfront land.”). 
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change would be unconstitutional if implemented by the legislature  
or executive agencies.  Lastly, a limited interpretation of the public 
trust doctrine will maintain clear and distinct boundary lines among 
the branches of government, thus eradicating any accountability 
issues associated with such decisions. 
